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Punitive Inclusion 
A Political Economy of Irregular Migration in the Margins of Europe 
 
Leonidas K. Cheliotis 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
Critical approaches to national and international efforts to manage the flows of poor 
immigrants into advanced Western economies over recent decades have tended to be 
premised on the notion of physical or geographical exclusion. Accordingly, nation-
states, transnational regions and even whole continents have been described as 
striving to solidify their borders against immigration from impoverished or otherwise 
disadvantaged parts of the globe (see, e.g., van Houtum, 2010; Carr, 2012). This claim 
appears to contain a significant element of truth when one considers, for instance, that 
irregular migrants are often forced by border regimes to navigate risky border zones, 
and, indeed, that many of them die as a result (see further Weber and Pickering, 2011; 
Albahari, 2015; Bigo, 2015). There is increasing recognition in literature on migration, 
however, that borders can be far more permeable than usually assumed, and they are 
thus better described as points of variable intensity than as strictly linear and rigid 
structures (Rahola, 2011; see also Bourbeau, 2011). A considerable number of 
scholars working in this vein have sought to explain the permeability of borders from 
the perspective of political economy, extending their focus beyond practical factors 
that may undermine effective border control as such (e.g., extensive borderlands or 
limited availability of financial resources), and rather privileging the role played by 
governing elites inside nation-states in adopting policies and promoting practices that 
essentially relax border controls so as to enable mass import of exploitable migrant 
labour according to domestic market needs and dominant political interests (see 
further Wacquant, 1999; De Giorgi, 2010). This article sets out to address the ways in 
which migrant labour exploitation is actually achieved; a question that political 
economy analyses of policies and practices of immigration and border control have 
left understudied to date.  
There is no shortage of accounts arguing that, over recent decades, deprivation, 
wars, human rights abuses, and other adversities in various parts of the world have 
combined with advancement in transport and communication technologies to give rise 
to a global pool of exploitable migrant labour. Yet the ways in which migrant labour 
exploitability is maintained and, indeed, enhanced inside the borders of so-called 
‘host’ countries have yet to receive sufficiently comprehensive scholarly attention. 
Pertinent research has so far focused either on unjust welfare and employment 
policies that are designed to keep migrants socio-politically weak, for example 
through systematically restricting their access to welfare and labour rights, or on 
aggressive penal and cognate policies that target migrants and threaten them into 
acceptance of unfair conditions of work (see, e.g., Bigo, 2002; Melossi, 2003; 
Calavita, 2005; Lawrence, 2007; Lazaridis, 2011; Brotherton and Barrios, 2011; 
Sawyer and Blitz, 2011). Its indisputable importance notwithstanding, this body of 
work is nevertheless limited in scope. With a few partial exceptions (e.g., Andreas, 
2009; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b; Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013; De Giorgi, 2010), little 
recognition has been paid to a host of emergent themes: the functional equivalence 
and aggregate effect of seemingly unrelated state policies on matters of welfare, 
employment and punishment, insofar as they bolster, simultaneously as well as 
cumulatively, migrants’ exploitability in the labour market; the contributions other 
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state policies (e.g., on immigration and asylum) and certain informal practices by non-
state actors (e.g., street-level acts of violence performed by private citizens or political 
formations) may additionally make to the same outcome, whether by design or 
coincidence; the precise mechanisms through which the policies and practices in 
question buttress migrant labour exploitability; the ways in which different policies 
and practices may actually stand in a relationship of operational complementarity, 
their respective modes of application interacting and reinforcing one another, either 
materially or symbolically; and the specific institutional arrangements (e.g., 
legislation and bureaucratic structures and cultures) that facilitate the application of 
such policies and practices. In neglecting the above themes, one risks undermining not 
only the multiplicity of bases of migrant labour exploitability, but also the complexity 
and intensity of the issue, thereby ultimately overlooking the full scope and 
downplaying the intricate and persistent nature of the political and policy 
interventions required to overturn it.  
With a view to helping fill these gaps in the literature and thereby promote 
suitable responses against migrant labour exploitation, this article focuses on the case 
of Greece and the treatment irregular migrants have been afforded in the country over 
recent decades. There are three main reasons why Greece lends herself ideally for the 
analytic purposes at hand. Firstly, the estimated absolute number and proportional 
population share of irregular migrants residing on Greek soil have persistently stood 
at exceptionally high levels by European standards ever since Greece first became a 
country of net immigration in the 1990s. Secondly, the country’s extensive informal 
labour market has since readily absorbed large cohorts of workers without papers. 
And thirdly, there is by now ample scholarly and other evidence regarding the array 
of unjust and abusive realities irregular migrants typically experience both inside and 
outside the labour market in Greece. A fully comprehensive overview of such 
evidence has yet to be produced, which goes some way towards explaining the 
disproportionately limited attention paid to date to the links between migrant labour 
exploitation and policies and practices against migrants in domains other than 
employment as such; links that have become all the more prominent since Greece was 
plunged into recession in 2008 and full-blown financial crisis in 2009. 
Bringing together material from a variety of Greek and international sources, 
spanning scholarly research, media reports and official documentation by government 
and independent actors, the article sets out to offer an unprecedentedly wide-ranging 
summary of policies and practices that systematically disadvantage or otherwise harm 
irregular migrants in the context of contemporary Greece. The article also presents an 
original synthesis of media reports and scholarly, polling company and NGO research 
on dominant political discourse and public opinion in Greece, which suggests that the 
political construction of a nexus between immigration and crime underpins an 
impressive degree of public support towards the policies and practices at issue. By 
reference to key tenets and insights of scholarship on political domination and surplus 
labour appropriation, the article meanwhile identifies the multifarious ways in which 
these policies and practices serve in tandem to promote migrants’ exploitation in the 
workplace. 
A few caveats regarding the article’s analytic scope and method are in order at 
this juncture. To begin with, the article covers developments that have taken place in 
Greece since the early 1990s, at which time immigration policy started taking shape in 
the country so as to deal with what was already a rapidly growing influx of foreigners 
and especially undocumented migrants. The cut-off point of the analysis is the 
beginning of 2015, when a coalition government led by the left-wing Syriza party 
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assumed power against the backdrop of a refugee crisis mounting in various parts of 
the globe and manifesting itself particularly acutely in Greek border areas. This 
temporal span was necessary partly due to limitations of space, and partly because at 
the time of writing the Syriza-led coalition had been in office for too short a period for 
its policies on immigration to be conclusively assessed. With regard to the preceding 
two-and-a-half decades, moreover, the article does not distinguish between policies 
under governments of avowedly different ideological orientation, nor does it seek to 
differentiate between policies according to contemporaneous changes in the socio-
demographic composition of irregular immigrants in Greece (e.g., the substantial 
decrease in the proportion of Albanians, and the increase in the proportion of Asians 
and Africans, by the late 2000s). Again, such analysis would have been impossible 
here for reasons of space but would have been redundant, too; indeed, a diversion 
from the main substantive aim of the article. This is because any differences between 
the immigration policies of the two political parties that alternately dominated 
government until mid-2012 (PASOK, on the centre-left, and New Democracy, on the 
centre-right), before joining forces in the context of a centre-right-led coalition that 
ruled until January 2015, have been convincingly identified in prior research as 
mostly superficial (see further Baldwin-Edwards, 2014). It is true that successive 
waves of irregular migrants have varied not only by the main country or region of 
origin and other socio-demographic characteristics, but also to a significant degree by 
the niches they have respectively occupied in Greece’s informal labour market 
(during the 1990s, for example, Albanians were predominant in unskilled farm work 
and the construction industry, whilst since the 2000s Chinese have usually filled gaps 
in retail stores and trade, and Bangladeshis in restaurants). But this should by no 
means detract from the fact that Greek immigration policy has undergone little 
substantive change over the years.  
 
The Porosity of Borders 
In trying to enter Greece, be it by land or sea, irregular migrants often find themselves 
at serious risk of death. This is partly due to the country’s geographical location and 
the natural dangers this implies for clandestine border-crossing (e.g., very low 
temperatures during winter at the mountainous Greek-Bulgarian border, frequent sea 
storms in the Aegean) and partly due to hazardous practices followed by border 
authorities in Greece, some of which are in blatant violation of international refugee 
and human rights legislation (e.g., refoulement of refugees at sea; see further Pro Asyl, 
2007; Human Rights Watch, 2008; UNHCR, 2009; Lauth Bacas, 2010; Amnesty 
International, 2012b). The Greek state has long failed to keep records on the 
prevalence of death in the process of clandestine border-crossing. Secondary analysis 
of domestic and international media reports, itself bound to provide under-estimates 
precisely because of the nature of its sources, has nevertheless revealed hundreds of 
fatalities and an even greater and growing number of ‘missing persons’ since the early 
1990s (Baldwin-Edwards, 2009; FRA, 2011; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). 
Irregular immigration to Greece has nonetheless undergone an impressive 
overall rise during the same period. Whilst regular immigration to the country has 
increased only modestly, the estimated growth of irregular immigration to Greece has 
been by far the highest in Europe. By 2011, for instance, the absolute number of 
undocumented migrants in Greece was approximately 390,000, which nearly 
amounted to one-third of the estimated total of 1,239,472 immigrants in the country 
that year, itself comprising around one-tenth of the country’s total population 
(Maroukis, 2012a, 2012b; see also Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012).  
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That Greece is such a common destination for irregular migrants is due only in 
part to the practical difficulties involved in controlling the country’s unusually 
extensive borderline, which spans 1,170 kilometers of land borders and the longest 
coastline in Europe, at 13,676 kilometers, including far-stretching land and coastal 
borders with several migrant source countries (e.g., Turkey, Albania) and hundreds of 
remote islands scattered across the Mediterranean and the Aegean. It would be remiss 
not to note that large flows of irregular immigration have effectively been channelled 
towards Greece’s perilous though still porous borders by ever-tightening restrictions 
imposed across Europe upon irregular immigration from other parts of the world, in 
the form, for example, of stricter policing of national borders and narrowed 
opportunities for accessing asylum and visa procedures (Xenakis, 2004).
1
 At least 
until the financial crisis hit Greece in 2009, the country’s large informal labour market 
(including, for example, agriculture, the construction industry, and domestic services) 
easily incorporated unskilled and semi-skilled workers without papers, yet it has long 
been common for irregular migrants to view Greece as a transit country on their way 
to mainland Europe, where the prospects of long-term and permanent settlement 
appear more appealing (see further Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008).  
Most crucially, however, and despite repeated official proclamations to the 
contrary, the Greek state itself has introduced policies and promoted practices that 
have helped to maintain the size of the irregular migrant population in the country at 
consistently high levels, not only engaging in piecemeal attempts at blocking irregular 
migration routes into Greece, but also failing to facilitate processes of asylum, 
regularisation, deportation, or even voluntary repatriation for migrants without papers. 
In particular, measures purportedly taken to secure national borders against irregular 
migration have been conspicuously delayed and insufficient; the infamous barbed-
wire fence that was constructed in the region of Evros in 2012, for example, extends 
only across 12.5 kilometres of the country’s 206-kilometre mainland borders with 
Turkey, at most serving to divert irregular migratory flows to the Greek-Turkish sea 
borders. Meanwhile, as discussed in some detail later, asylum and regularisation 
procedures have been notoriously arduous, protracted and, for the overwhelming 
majority of applicants, ineffectual. Similarly, efforts to apprehend and deport irregular 
migrants have long been known to be of limited efficiency and effectiveness, so much 
so that the annual rates of apprehensions and deportations have both followed an 
overall downward trend over the years. Finally, whilst voluntary repatriation schemes 
for undocumented migrants remain little used, the legal maximum length of 
administrative detention of irregular migrants underwent repeated extensions before 
being rendered indefinite in April 2014 (see further Triandafyllidou, 2014; Cheliotis, 
2013, 2015).  
In this sense, it is fair to conclude, as Carr (2012: 108) does, that Greece is for 
irregular migrants a ‘trap’ (see also Anderson, 2000: 49-56). Viewed through the 
analytic lens of political economy, this phenomenon is inextricably linked to the 
combination of three contingencies in the country’s informal labour market: first, its 
unusually large size, estimated to account for around 25 per cent of GDP, one of the 
highest proportions in the EU-27 (European Commission, 2012); second, its capitalist 
nature, insofar as it predominantly relies on exploitative conditions of work to ensure 
that employers derive excessive gains (e.g., that the surplus generated by workers is 
appropriated by the owners of the means of production); and third, the ample 
                                                 
1
 At the same time, Greece has also received unaccompanied migrant children and adult asylum seekers 
returned from neighbouring Italy in contravention of pertinent international legislation (Human Rights 
Watch, 2013b). 
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opportunities for employment it affords outsiders. Broader developments such as the 
construction boom in the 1990s, the expansion of export-oriented labour-intensive 
farming, and the rise of dual-income nuclear families against the backdrop of 
persistently minimal levels of state welfare provision for the elderly and young 
children, have heightened demand for a wide range of low-prestige and poorly paid 
menial labour (e.g., building, fruit-picking, domestic care work) that unemployed 
Greek nationals have grown increasingly likely to shun, many even under conditions 
of financial crisis (see further Triandafyllidou, 2013; also Cavounidis, 2006; 
Lawrence, 2007; Demoussis et al., 2010). In other words, that large numbers of 
irregular migrants find themselves ‘trapped’ in Greece is in good part because they 
lend themselves as a highly exploitable workforce fit for the needs of the country’s 
shadow economy.
2
  
Research on wage differentials in Greece clearly points in this direction, given 
that the wages of migrant workers have been found to be systematically and 
significantly lower than those of their native counterparts, partly because migrants are 
usually pushed into low-paid jobs regardless of their skills and prior experience, and 
partly as a result of discriminatory practices against them within their occupations 
(see further Demoussis et al., 2010; Drydakis and Vlassis, 2010; Lianos et al., 1996; 
Fakiolas, 1999). What has yet to be explained in sufficient scope and depth, whether 
in relation to the Greek case or other cases where similar arguments have been made, 
concerns the ways in which irregular migrants are turned into exploitable workers. It 
is to this issue that the article now turns.  
 
Irregular Status and Labour Exploitation 
As a general rule, the degree to which workers are amenable to having their labour 
exploited increases with the level of flexibilisation of working conditions and the 
intensity of job precariousness in particular; a phenomenon aptly captured by Pierre 
Bourdieu’s (1998: 85) portmanteau term ‘flexploitation’. The effectiveness of job 
precariousness as a mechanism of labour control is further enhanced in two 
complementary and mutually reinforcing ways. On one hand, the creation and 
maintenance of a large reserve pool of workers increases the perceived certainty of 
precariousness, signalling to those already in wage labour that they are, in fact, easily 
replaceable. On the other hand, the reduction of welfare provisions for those out of 
work raises the costs of prospective unemployment for current wage labourers, and of 
continued unemployment for their would-be reserves, thus pushing the former and 
preparing the latter to settle for exploitation in the workplace (see further Wright et al., 
1998; Harvey, 2006).  
The massive swathes of irregular migrants who keep crossing the porous 
Greek borders in search of a better future lend themselves ideally both as exploitable 
workers and amenable reserves. For one, their numbers help ensure that a sufficiently 
large pool of ‘surplus’ labourers is always at hand, whilst their desperate predicament 
as a result of poverty and attendant needs (e.g., to earn a living) further inclines them 
to exploitability if and when a job becomes available. Indeed, although immigrants 
are excluded in Greece from national indices of poverty, they are over-represented 
amongst the poorest and most vulnerable (Tsakloglou and Mitrakos, 2006; NSSG, 
2010).  
Irregular migrants’ exploitability as wage labourers cannot be adequately 
                                                 
2
 Other explanations for the ‘trapping’ of irregular migrants in Greece, most notably accounts of 
politico-economic pressures exerted to this end on Greece from other EU member-states, are beyond 
the scope of this article.  
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explained, however, without also considering the consequences that stem from their 
irregular status itself. In Greece at least, irregularity precludes one from access either 
to legal employment and labour rights or to welfare benefits. In other words, 
irregularity does not just restrict migrants’ prospects for paid employment to the 
informal labour market, where wages can freely be shrunk well below the legal 
minimum and layoffs go entirely unchecked. It also deprives migrants of any welfare 
entitlements (including even emergency social assistance) that would soften the 
sanction of dismissal and the strains of unemployment more generally (European 
Committee of Social Rights, 2010). In sum, irregularity promotes labour exploitation 
in that it facilitates both the depression of wages as such and the production of 
conditions that make depressed wages more likely to be accepted by workers.  
Greek governments have been far from oblivious to the wide scope for labour 
exploitation that mass poverty and irregularity of status generate in the country’s vast 
shadow economy. To take perhaps the most telling example, commenting on the 
growing influx of irregular migrants from Albania into Greece in the mid-1990s, the 
then Minister of Finance and known ardent supporter of neoliberal socio-economic 
policies Stefanos Manos publicly stated as much: ‘I am enthusiastic about Albanians! 
It is, of course, illegal work [that they can only offer], but this is a precondition for 
their labour to be provided at a low price’ (cited in Karydis, 2011: 100; see also 
Baldwin-Edwards, 2014: 326). 
Whilst Greece has ratified a number of key international and European treaties 
that guarantee fundamental rights for all, it has been reluctant to grant legal status to 
refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants more generally. Indeed, Greek border 
authorities have been found to actively discourage apprehended irregular entrants 
from seeking international protection in the first instance (see, e.g., Human Rights 
Watch, 2008). Although rates of asylum applications to Greece have nevertheless 
grown to be amongst the highest in Europe, the country has maintained one of the 
lowest rates of refugee recognition in the continent and one of the highest rates of 
asylum cases pending in the world (Papadimitriou & Papageorgiou, 2005; Eurostat, 
2010; UNHCR, 2010), having long failed to establish an effective and timely system 
for processing applications (CPT, 2011; see also Karamanidou, 2007; Papadopoulou-
Kourkoula, 2008; Karamanidou and Schuster, 2011; Cabot, 2014). This failure has 
certainly not been for want of financial resources: as admitted in April 2012 by 
Michalis Chrysochoidis, Minister of Citizen Protection at the time, Greece had thus 
far used no more than €40 million out of €250 million of allocated EU funding for 
immigration and asylum management, including for facilitating procedures of asylum 
application (Human Rights Watch, 2012).  
In a similar vein, regularisation in Greece has been substantively narrow and 
procedurally perverse. In the vast majority of cases, regularisation is effectively 
reduced to seeking a renewable residence or work permit of very short duration.
3
 The 
process of reguralisation, including renewal of temporary permits, has meanwhile 
been fraught with a series of grave challenges over the years. Before all else, whilst 
the volume of regularisation applications received by Greek authorities is one of the 
highest in Europe (McKay et al., 2011), access to the application process is anything 
but straightforward. Pertinent information is usually limited and unclear, formal 
eligibility criteria are tight, and deeply unfair financial impediments are in place, 
including, most notably, excessively high application fees and, for the purposes of 
renewing a work permit, the legal requirement that applicants themselves assume the 
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 Rejected asylum seekers may also apply for regularisation. 
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burden of paying their social insurance contributions when their employer has refused 
or otherwise failed to do so. Lengthy delays are also common in the assessment and 
subsequent stages of applications as a consequence of complex bureaucratic 
procedures, inadequate training and poor staffing levels, to the effect that permits 
have at times been granted after their expiration date, whilst decision-making has 
often been found to be arbitrary and inconsistent. Practically, then, the best case 
scenario for most migrants seeking regularisation is to find themselves in limbo, 
shifting between regular and irregular status with long breaks filled with uncertainty 
and anxiety in between, when their chances of falling victim to unscrupulous lawyers, 
mafia operators and corrupt state officials are also greater (see further Baldwin-
Edwards, 2014; Cabot, 2014; Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008; Gialis et al., 2014).  
 
Political Discourse and Public Attitudes about Immigrants 
Despite –or, indeed, as we shall see, because of– the contribution immigrants make to 
Greek economy, they are systematically subject to stigmatisation. Mainstream 
political discourse in Greece has typically employed apocalyptic language to frame 
immigrants as an undifferentiated mass that poses a variety of serious threats to Greek 
society, from ethno-cultural disintegration and health deterioration to unemployment 
and, most notably, crime, often also associating these purported threats to one another.
 Particularly as concerns the issue of crime, such discourse points, on one hand, 
to what is presented as an inexorable rise in police-recorded crime rates in Greece 
since immigration into the country started rising in the early 1990s, and, on the other 
hand, to the over-representation of non-Greeks both in official crime statistics and the 
country’s prison population, especially the fact that they have come to outnumber 
Greeks behind bars. Nowhere is the constructed nexus between immigration and 
crime more acute than in the case of irregular migrants, who, before anything else, are 
ascribed a criminal label by mere dint of their irregular status itself (see further 
Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2013a, 2013b; also Tzanelli, 2006; Karamanidou, 2007; 
Karyotis, 2012). A series of important facts are obscured by this discourse: that crime 
in Greece has remained moderate by European standards; that Greeks are still 
responsible for the bulk of offences committed, and that their participation has in 
recent years grown substantially in the case of certain key property and violent 
offences (e.g., thefts, burglaries, robberies, homicides); and that there are strong anti-
foreigner biases in police practices and judicial decision-making processes, which 
inflate the proportional share of immigrants in crime and prison statistics (see further 
Papandreou, 2009; Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2010, 2011; Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2013b).  
 Despite distorting lived reality, mainstream political discourse appears to 
have had an appreciable degree of influence on public attitudes, either inciting or 
sustaining and exacerbating concern about the impact of immigration on Greek 
society, fear of crime by immigrants, and punitiveness towards them. Comparative 
survey research, for example, has demonstrated that anti-foreigner sentiment is higher 
in Greece than anywhere else in Europe (Semyonov et al., 2006; Mulcahy, 2011), and 
that Greeks hold the most negative views on the continent regarding the impact of 
foreigners on society, including their impact on crime (Semyonov et al., 2012; see 
also Semyonov et al., 2008; Semyonov and Glikman, 2009; Ceobanu, 2011; Mulcahy, 
2011; Swarts and Karakatsanis, 2013; Figgou et al., 2011). Domestic survey research 
has meanwhile found that Greeks are more likely to favour stricter police treatment 
for immigrants than for natives, just as they are more likely to favour imprisonment 
for immigrant offenders than for offenders from other socio-demographic groups (see 
further Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2011).  
 8 
It has been shown additionally that a substantial proportion of the Greek 
public supports control measures specifically oriented against irregular immigration, 
such as simplification of extradition proceedings, denial of political asylum, and 
enhanced border controls (Papastamou et al., 2005). Indeed, in January 2011, the then 
recently announced construction of the barbed-wire fence along a section of the 
country’s mainland borders with Turkey was met with especially high levels of public 
approval, ranging according to different opinion polls between 59 and 80 per cent  
(Public Issue, 2011; Proto Thema, 16 January 2011; Ethnos, 17 January 2011). These 
attitudes, not unlike increased consent to situational crime control measures that 
compromise personal convenience and liberties since immigration into Greece began 
its upward climb in the early 1990s, are linked to the widespread perception of 
immigrants as the primary source of criminal danger and associated insecurities (see 
further Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2011). 
Since the onset of the Greek financial crisis in 2009, the messages put forward 
by the neo-fascistic party Chrysi Avyi (‘Golden Dawn’), and the degree to which they 
have found appeal amongst the Greek public, have taken hostility towards immigrants 
in general and irregular migrants in particular to an even higher level. Chrysi Avyi has 
mainly based its discourse on an anti-immigrant platform, not only castigating 
irregular immigrants for their purported role in rising crime rates and falling living 
standards for the Greek majority –indeed, immigrants are systematically referred to as 
‘filth’, ‘rubbish’ and ‘subhuman’ in official party rhetoric–, but also calling for 
cracking down on irregular immigration by laying landmines along the Greek-Turkish 
mainland borders and placing special forces in the area with a licence to shoot at will 
(Human Rights Watch, 2012; see also Psarras, 2012; Xenakis, 2012; Vasilopoulou 
and Halikiopoulou, 2015). The party has additionally threatened to have immigrants 
and their children thrown out of hospitals and kindergartens (see, e.g., The Guardian, 
12 June 2012), has requested in parliament that ethno-racial segregation be enforced 
in schools (Eleftherotypia, 14 March 2013), and has spoken about the need to 
reinstate the death penalty in the country as a means of dealing with ‘foreign 
murderers’ (Eleftherotypia, 30 March 2013).  
A significant and growing minority of the Greek population appears to agree 
with this discourse. Not only did Chrysi Avyi see its share of the vote increase from a 
slender 0.3 per cent in the national elections of 2009 to 6.9 per cent in those of June 
2012. It also managed to attract similar levels of support in all three subsequent 
national elections, including those of September 2015, thereby consolidating its 
position as the third largest parliamentary party. This was despite the arrest and pre-
trial detention in late 2013 of several of its MPs, including party leader Nikos 
Michaloliakos, on charges of involvement in a criminal organisation responsible for 
multiple cases of homicide and a series of other serious offences, a development 
triggered by the murder of a Greek left-wing anti-fascist musician in the Keratsini 
district of Piraeus (see further Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2015; Vasilopoulou and 
Halikiopoulou, 2015). This goes a long way towards explaining why centre-left 
PASOK and centre-right New Democracy have both increasingly sought to intensify 
their anti-migrant rhetoric, and have co-opted the far-right agenda in so doing 
(Karamanidou, 2015).  
To account for the political use of anti-migrant rhetoric solely by reference to 
its electoral appeal, however, stops short of explaining why such rhetoric should be 
appealing in the first instance. To put the point differently, why would the Greek 
public hold views or fall for political narratives that blatantly misrepresent a 
population of weaker others, let alone weaker others so useful to the country’s 
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economy as irregular migrants? It is easy to see how anti-migrant narratives can 
resonate in the context of a strongly nationalistic society with deeply entrenched racist 
attitudes and a markedly declining birth rate, not to mention the intensification of 
socio-economic insecurities amongst large segments of the public since the outbreak 
of the financial crisis in 2009. Yet at least part of the answer requires that we grasp 
the role of anti-migrant narratives in helping to authorise policies and practices that 
effectively serve the economic interests of the average Greek by heightening the 
exploitability of irregular migrants in the country’s informal labour market. 
 
Violence and Labour Exploitation 
A continuum of physical violence, both threatened and enacted, has long unfurled 
against migrants in Greece under the pretext of fighting crime across the country and 
reducing fear of criminal victimisation amongst the Greek public. Alongside state 
violence, carried out routinely on large scales by a series of criminal justice and 
cognate institutions, repertoires of violence are performed on smaller scales, albeit not 
necessarily less systematically, by non-state actors such as private citizens and 
political groups and organisations. In important respects, state and non-state actors 
may be bound together by strong ties of mutual dependence and support. Just as, for 
example, Greek state authorities may rely on information from members of the public 
in order to be able to initiate and carry through proceedings of arrest, detention and 
deportation against individuals residing or working in the country without papers, so 
too they may tolerate or promote anti-migrant violence perpetrated by non-state actors, 
often even by colluding with them. This continuum of physical violence is actually 
the means by which labour exploitability is maximised amongst migrants in Greece, 
even if not all violent actors are consciously or otherwise invested in labour 
exploitation as such. 
Generally speaking, the use of violence against unruly employees compensates, 
at least in part, for the imperfection of job precariousness and workers’ socio-
economic weakness as the key practical bases of labour exploitation. As well as 
increasing the perceived certainty of punishment, regular exhibitions of pure force 
against unruly workers also heighten the costs of either repeating or reproducing the 
behaviour in question. This, in turn, helps to quell or pre-empt instances of individual 
and collective worker resistance, be they oriented towards altering the conditions of 
extant employment or seeking to promote disengagement from the system of market 
exchange with employers in favour of alternative sources of paid labour (e.g., self-
employment). The way in which reserve pools of workers are kept in check is not 
dissimilar, insofar as large-scale intimidation through widespread enactments of 
violence forces them into submission to the established order (see further Wright et al., 
1998; Wrong, 1979, 1994).  
To return to the case of Greece, the combination of force against unruly 
workers and a broader environment of violent intimidation of immigrants as a whole 
is what adds impetus to control over irregular migrants and exploitation of their wage 
labour. To start with, irregular migrants have regularly been subject to blackmail by 
Greek employers who threaten either to report the undocumented status of 
troublesome employees to the police –in which case deportation proceedings would 
be triggered against the individuals concerned– or to call upon the violent ‘rent-a-
mob’ services of Chrysi Avyi to deal with them (see further Reyneri, 2001; 
Papaioannou, 2013; Chrysochoou, 2014).  
On occasion, custodians have been put in place to exercise surveillance over 
workers and mete out physical punishment as necessary. To take the most well-known 
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example, that of the vast strawberry plantation of Nea Manolada in the southern 
Peloponnese, irregular migrants from Bangladesh have been forced to live in barracks 
under degrading conditions and to pay more than half their meagre salary to 
employers in rent. Long tolerated by officials at the Greek Ministry of Labour, this 
situation only came to broad public attention in April 2013, when some 200 workers 
found themselves under gunfire by Greek foremen upon demanding six months’ 
unpaid wages. Dozens of workers were injured at the time, four of whom so badly as 
to be in need of hospitalisation, at which point the police swiftly initiated proceedings 
to have them deported. Upon completion of the ensuing rounds of court hearings with 
a verdict reached after a mere fifteen minutes, all four Greek defendants walked free, 
two cleared of all charges and two having received suspended sentences. Denied 
witness protection and still awaiting their dues by the time the case was tried, migrant 
plaintiffs were, by contrast, ordered to pay a total of 12,000 Euros as fine for having 
previously exercised their right to apply for change of judge on suspicion of bias. It 
comes as no surprise that irregular migrants’ labour exploitation in the plantation in 
question has reportedly continued unabated (see further Channel 4, 6 March 2013; 
The Guardian, 1 September 2014; also, more generally, Lawrence 2005, 2007).  
Beyond the immediate environment of the workplace, immigrant communities 
are systematically subject to intimidatory practices of over-policing, including a 
greater likelihood of being stopped and searched, alongside so-called ‘sweep’ or 
‘cleaning operations’ launched in the name of fighting illegal immigration and 
associated crimes. Similarly, immigrants are significantly more likely to be brought to 
a police station than Greek persons, just as they are more likely to be arrested by the 
police regardless of whether one accounts for the number of arrests for deportation 
(see further EU-MIDIS, 2010; Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2011). Police violence against 
immigrants is also reportedly commonplace, ranging from the unwarranted use of 
force and the deliberate destruction of residence permits during routine identity 
checks, to physical maltreatment in police stations (see, e.g., Amnesty International, 
2012a; see also Samatas, 2011: 433-434).  
Police authorities have meanwhile shown extraordinary tolerance to cases 
where members of Chrysi Avyi have systematically conducted open attacks on 
immigrants and their property (purporting, ironically, to be re-establishing law and 
order in the absence of state action), and where they have issued threats against 
activist organisations that provide assistance to immigrants in need, such as the 
medical NGO Doctors of the World (see Eleftherotypia, 8 February 2013).
4
 Several 
such activities, including attacks on the market stalls of immigrant traders by MPs and 
other members of Chrysi Avyi, have been captured on film and used by the party 
itself in propaganda and intimidation campaigns (see further Xenakis and Cheliotis, 
2013b). To the extent that governments have recognised the existence of anti-migrant 
far-right violence at all, its effects have generally been neutralised and its control has 
been approached in a self-defeating fashion. In October 2012, for example, the then 
Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection Nikos Dendias advocated the policing 
of immigrants as a key means of tackling far-right violence in the country  (Financial 
Times, 18 October 2012), thereby not only confusing victims with their victimisers, 
but also disregarding reports of police collusion with Chrysi Avyi and high levels of 
                                                 
4
 Since the financial crisis hit Greece, the party has also organised soup kitchens, food distribution and 
blood donations only for natives, and has established a network of doctors providing free consultations 
again to Greeks alone, hence the network has officially been named ‘Doctors with Borders’ (see further 
The Independent, 30 March 2013). 
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infiltration of the force by members of the party (see further Psarras, 2012; 
Papaioannou, 2013; Christopoulos, 2014; Amnesty International, 2014).  
More generally, racist violence has been a serious and rapidly growing issue in 
Greece. Official data are bound to downplay its prevalence, both because of practices 
of under-recording and insufficient investigation, prosecution and punishment of such 
cases by the police and judicial authorities (especially when police officers are 
implicated as perpetrators), and because of underreporting by victims themselves due 
to lack of confidence in the Greek criminal justice system, fear of reprisals, and active 
dissuasion by the state. In the latter respect, for example, a €100 fee was introduced in 
2010 as a prerequisite to the investigation of complaints against the police, whilst 
undocumented migrants have additionally been effectively threatened with 
punishment should they report their victimisation. At the beginning of 2013, amidst 
fanfare accompanying the launch of a police hotline for reporting racist violence 
against immigrants, the Chief of Hellenic Police made clear that victims with irregular 
status would not be offered ‘some form of asylum’ but would rather be arrested and 
deported (To Vima, 21 January 2013; see further Amnesty International, 2012a; 
Human Rights Watch, 2012; NCHR, 2011; RED, 2012).  
Data provided by Greek and international NGOs, however, suffice to indicate 
the graveness of the problem. During the first six months of 2011 alone, for example, 
the NGO Doctors of the World estimated that their Athens clinic had treated 300 
victims of racist attacks, whilst the NGO Praksis claimed to have treated just over 200 
victims over the same period. Furthermore, according to local anti-racist organisations, 
at least 300 attacks on immigrants took place between April and June 2012 in Greece 
(Human Rights Watch, 2012; Associated Press, 19 June 2012; see also Amnesty 
International, 2012b). Racist violence has grown to be so acute that, in late 2012, the 
US Embassy in Athens issued an official public warning to American citizens residing 
in or travelling to Greece about a heightened risk of attack for those whose 
complexion might lead them to be perceived as foreign migrants (US Embassy in 
Athens, Greece, 2012; see also BBC, 10 January 2013). Albeit exceptional in terms of 
foreign relations and diplomatic practice, the US Embassy’s warning was in tune with 
a growing body of reports from domestic and, especially, international media and 
organisations that have revealed and strongly condemned Greece for the high and 
rising prevalence of inhumane treatment of immigrants in the country, as well as for 
the long-standing and continuing failure of Greek state authorities to properly 
acknowledge and tackle the issue (see, e.g., Amnesty International, 2012a; Cheliotis, 
2013; Human Rights Watch, 2013a). 
The continuum of violence against migrants in Greece extends to sentencing 
and custodial policies and practices. As soon as immigration to Greece began to rise 
in the 1990s, the country’s crumbling prisons started filling with immigrants typically 
serving long-term sentences for relatively minor infractions. Indeed, owing largely to 
biases in the sentencing behaviour of judges, non-Greek prisoners have come to 
outnumber their Greek counterparts in recent years, amounting, for example, to 7,875, 
or 60 per cent, out of a total of 12,912 pre-trial and convicted prisoners on 1 January 
2013, with a significant and increasing proportion of non-Greeks –half of them by 
2012, for instance– being imprisoned in connection with irregular migration (see 
further Cheliotis, 2012; Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2011, 2016, forthcoming). In line with 
what is known in penological literature as the ‘less eligibility’ principle, whereby the 
working and unemployed poor are controlled by being constantly threatened with a 
fate even worse than their poverty, the looming prospect of imprisonment combines 
with the overhanging threat of administrative detention under notoriously inhumane 
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and degrading conditions (Cheliotis, 2013) to enhance the exploitability of irregular 
migrants in the job market, whether as wage labourers or as reserves.
5
  
 
Concluding Remarks: The Limits of Inclusion 
On a broad, conceptual level, this article seeks to problematise the dominant critical 
perspective on border control policies and practices that have evolved in response to 
the flows of poor immigrants into advanced Western economies over recent decades. 
The dominant critical perspective views exclusion as the intended outcome and 
practical effect of border controls, and either openly or implicitly proposes inclusion 
as a more just and humane alternative. Focusing on the case of Greece and the 
treatment irregular migrants are afforded in the country, this article first draws 
attention to ways in which purportedly exclusionary policies and practices of border 
control may be imperfect by design, before proceeding to demonstrate that the 
partiality of efforts to exclude irregular migrants from national territories may be 
necessary for the promotion of particular politico-economic interests domestically. In 
the Greek case, the inclusion of irregular migrants has been crucial to the country’s 
large informal labour market and to native employers operating therein, just as it has 
been essential, by extension, to political elites seeking to retain and broaden their 
electoral clienteles (Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2013b).  
Moving on to address the exploitative agenda behind irregular migrants’ 
inclusion in the Greek labour market, the article argues that migrant labour 
exploitation has essentially required that inclusion take a combination of specific and 
ascertainable forms: generous in terms of the sheer size of incomers; meagre as 
concerns provision of social and legal rights and entitlements to them; and dynamic in 
the sense of physically controlling their behaviour in the workplace and beyond. To 
this end, apparently unrelated policies on matters of immigration, welfare, 
employment and punishment, together with practices of anti-migrant brutality and 
intimidation by state and non-state actors, have effectively formed a continuum of 
violence that forces irregular migrants either to submit to any available condition of 
work or to await for their chance in a disciplined fashion. 
Labour exploitation has not always been an intended effect on the part of the 
actors involved, nor the sole function served in the process. The findings of this article 
nevertheless suggest that the conventional distinction between exclusion and inclusion 
needs to be unpicked for the woes of irregular migration to be successfully grasped 
and tackled.  
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